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What A Relief: A Response
Posted by on January 16, 2012
This will be my second response to fellow blogger John’s two posts For Goodness Sake and What A Relief (note: these two posts were not necessarily written as a two-part series. I just decided to conjoin my responses with these two posts as I felt that they were related.) (Also of note, I won’t be addressing the main point of the What A Relief post, but will be addressing something that I think is much more important.) To read my first response to For Goodness Sake, just click here.
Well, let’s get started…
Like in the first response, I won’t be recapping John’s post, so I suggest clicking the link above if you would like some context.
John wrote:
Presuming atheistic naturalism to be true, the Christians would represent the disappointed students, in that for all their efforts and self-sacrifice believing they were being piously obedient to a God they believed existed; all was in vain. All the passed up opportunities to indulge in fun things the Bible has placed on the don’t list: sex, drugs, and rock ‘n roll. Just like the students who took the time to study and focus on the test at hand, the Christians forewent life’s “sinful” distractions. But all the effort was for nothing…suckers.
On the other hand, the students who represent the Atheists weren’t prepared for the test and so is quite relieved the score will not count. They did whatever they were inclined to do, hindered only by their own conscience. Now, I wonder what would happen to the study habits of a student if he knew none of the scores on any test or assignment were going to count for anything? Studying would be optional. No more worries about failing, no more worries about discipline for non-participation, no more worries about getting sent to the principal’s office for mischief.
As I eluded to in my previous response, and as these two paragraphs validate, there is a fundamental difference as to how theists and non-theists approach the issue of morality. First, if we are to accept John’s initial paradigm and assume an atheistic naturalism (which I gladly will), the above cited passage connotes that non-theists indulge in morally bad habits. This is an entirely incorrect way to approach the moral actions of a non-theist. Rest assured, if I consider an action to be morally wrong, I would not commit said morally wrong act because I actually believe it to be morally wrong. In other words, if I considered ‘studying’ to be the morally correct thing to do, then I would study! (Shocker, I know.) The reason why I do certain acts which the typical theist would find morally wrong is because I don’t think these actions are wrong. John’s ‘student analogy’ fails for the simple reason that the paradigm is still constructed within a theistic framework, which is just a no-no given his presumption of an “atheistic-naturalism” for the purposes of his argument. If ‘studying’ was to be morally good within a naturalistic framework, then the non-theist would have studied. To extend the analogy, the problem that arises is that non-theists are not thoroughly convinced that studying is the morally correct thing to do. We, as non-theists, ask ‘why’ studying is the morally correct thing to do before we actually study. If it is shown to us that studying is moral, then we study. If not, then we don’t. It’s as simple as that. Therefore, it is nonsensical to assert that the non-theist would be relieved for having committed all the actions that we did, given that we don’t consider our actions to be immoral in the first place. The theist (I’ll just refer to Christianity from now on since this is the religion that John is defending), on the other hand, simply trusts the teacher when he says, “Studying is good.” The difference in approach to studying, to morality, is the fundamental difference between the morality of theists and non-theists, which brings me to my second point:
I pose the following to my theistic readers: Why is studying good? Why is “sex, drugs, and rock ‘n roll” bad? What are the reasons why (G) is good and (B) is bad? In essence, the theistic reformation of the Euthyphro dilemma (ED): “Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?” If the former, then there must be a source of morality other than God. If the latter, then morality is arbitrary and is subjectively dependent on the capricious whims of a bored god. Today’s favorite response by the theist is that this “dilemma” is, in fact, a false dilemma. There is actually a third horn: “God wills something because He is good.” In the video I just linked to, in which popular Christian apologist William Lane Craig talks about the ED, there is a moment (at about the 9:00 minute mark) where a non-theist asserts that the theistic response to the ED does not actually answer the dilemma, but merely pushes the question back. I agree with him in that the response merely pushes the question back, but I don’t agree with him in the manner that it does.
Why is God’s nature the way that it is? How do we know if this nature is morally “good”? Now, a quick theistic response to this second question (I fear this may be the only response that I know of that is worthy of mention) would be to say that, “God’s nature is such that it is necessarily perfectly good.” But what does “perfectly good” mean? By what standard can we determine what it means to be “perfectly good”? Let’s use an example to help me make my point clear:
God commands, “Thou shalt not murder.” But what makes murder bad? If we are being consistent, God commanded this because His nature is perfectly good and His edicts therefore reflect that nature. As such, his edict would reflect this perfectly good nature. But how do we know that “perfectly good” = “do not murder”? We certainly think that murder is bad, but how do we know that murder is necessarily bad and that “do not murder” is in-keeping with what is “perfectly good”?
“Why is murder bad?”
“Because God commanded us not to murder.”
“Why did God command us not to murder?”
“Because He has a perfectly good nature and His edicts reflect that nature.”
“What makes it so that God’s perfectly good nature is one that necessarily states that it is bad to murder?”
“Because not murdering someone is obviously morally superior to not murdering someone.”
You see, in order to say that God’s edicts are morally good, we must already know – without appealing to God – what it means to be “perfectly good”. ”Good”, according to Christian doctrine, is merely what God is, thus rendering the term meaningless. The Christian cannot answer what and why something is good without falling back on a meaningless – ultimately circular – tautology. The answer to why murder is bad would therefore, according to Christian doctrine, simply be because God’s nature is such that it renders murder “bad”, without actually explaining why it is bad. The Christian cannot answer why it is morally good to study rather than to not study.
Now, the Christian can always fall back on ‘old faithful’: faith. Without question (ideally), the Christian will have to assume by faith that it is morally good if God were to, say, command someone to slay their first-born child. And without even asking, “Why?”, this, my friends, is a very dangerous game to play.
“If the latter, then morality is arbitrary and is subjectively dependent on the capricious whims of a bored god.”
That’s a lot of assumption on your part. Even if your overly black and white premise is true that God determined specific moral behaviors as if it were a list of “do’s” and “don’t's,” would God really need to be capricious and bored to do so? Couldn’t there be slightly loftier motivations for an omnipotent, omniscient God to determine the standards of human morality? I know a non-theist rejects the notion of God (as well as the omnipotence and omniscience thing, too), but this line comes from your argument that if a God did exist, this would be the way he would approach the creation of a moral standards (or, more specifically), certain moral behaviors being good or bad.
Honestly, I once again disagree with John’s post. He doesn’t seem to be able to give the non-theist stance much respect. I think this may be unintentional, though – he simply cannot expound very well on issues from a non-theist perspective, so he constantly comes across as close-minded. Granted, the reciprocal is true, too, I think. (Consider my conversation with zqtx in the comments section of your last post. There did come a moment where he struggled to understand the basis of my belief, while I fully understand it and have embraced it. It’s rational proof vs. the leap of faith: the classic impasse.)
I believe that most theists and non-theists heed the same morals, and the majority of the time, both do so out of a very real desire to live well (or to “be good”). I think John’s inspection of our motivations to be moral people is off-base and, ultimately, a tangent to the larger issue, which is where morality actually comes from. You touch on this here somewhat, but I believe it warrants a much deeper conversation. The theist indeed begins with a belief that the standard for perfect goodness is found in a perfect God who interacts in the human experience while existing outside of it. The non-theist believes that perfect goodness can/must be determined inside the human experience because that is all there is. These are the respective sources for morality, and I believe it’s important to begin at the source, not farther down the river.
I admit that I was being a bit presumptive that my readers would be familiar with the Euthyphro dilemma, and perhaps I was a bit glib with the “capricious whims of a bored god,” bit, but I must ask: What would these “loftier motivations” be? Bear in mind, though, the implications of stating any “goals”. If there is a goal, say to promote the flourishing of human society as an example, this makes it so that there is no need for a supernal being. The point being that any “goal” that is given makes it so that there is no necessity for God when dealing with morality.
Could you perhaps expound on this?
Not a goal. The Christian belief is that all creation (including the universe, human beings, and the moral Law which abides within each person) were created out of and for the pleasure of God. This is quite different from a goal (especially since a goal is established in order to improve or fulfill something).
As for the statement you have asked to be expounded upon, what I have eluded to is not only a religious view but a monotheistic one at that, and I’m knee-deep in the Christian religion in particular. To expound, let me first back up.
The theist (or “religious”) stance on morality is that the moral Law (a.k.a. “the Law of Right and Wrong,” or “the Law of Good Behavior and Bad Behavior”) is not created by humankind, whether by societies or individuals. Rather, as C.S. Lewis intimated, this Law “presses in on us.” It tells us not what we are, but what we should be, and if we are honest, we know full well that we are not always what we should be (or do what we should do). Were the Law merely a description of how we live in general instead of a standard we should strive to keep, there would be no need for theism, because this Law could easily be explained as a very wise and astute description of human nature provided by human nature alone. But because all of us have, at some point in our lives, done wrong or neglected good (whether dramatically or subtly), the theist begins with a rather common sense observation that this Law exists outside of our lives – beyond it. After all, if it were merely the creation of humankind, would we not be able to press upon it instead of it press upon us? If humans fashioned, owned and directed this Law, would we not be able to suspend it? On the contrary, we find we cannot suspend this Law – it is ever present – and if we are to try, we find the motivation to do so boils down to selfishness (to place our concerns and convenience as a higher priority than obeying this Law) or even fear (to desire to escape guilt or punishment that comes from disobeying the Law).
Thus, the theist in general, and the Christian in particular, holds to the belief that this Law stands outside of human nature and its control. It exists in a different reality, if you will – one we may be able to disregard at times, but one we can never ignore. The next logical step, then, is to consider how such a Law could have come into being without a Mind conceiving it – a Mind that (once again as Lewis posits) “is conscious, and has purposes, and prefers one thing to another.” We have reason to believe (as stated above) that this Mind is not merely a collective of our own minds. Thus, just as the Law stands apart from humankind, so does this Mind. As for proof of this Mind’s interaction with humankind, we once again start with our knowledge of the Law (which is not our creation, but is nevertheless imbedded in each of us).
That doesn’t get me to the Christian God yet, or even sufficiently argue for a immanent “God” at all – only another reality above our own. But this reply is long enough as it is, and I think you can see where I’m headed.
Thank you for your thoughtful reply, Bo. As always, I always welcome your comments. I have a feeling this will be a lengthy conversation and I am looking forward to what this will produce!
Sorry, I thought you were saying there was a specific purpose (other than what you asserted just now, which I’ll get to in a moment) or goal. To be fair, though, you can see why I made this mistake since you insinuated that there may a “loftier goal”, but no matter. Simply a misunderstanding on my part.
I do understand what you’re saying (I read a lot of Lewis back when I was a Christian lol), but before I delve into it, I would like to ask you a question to see where you stand, rather than just assume: This Law that sort of reigns over and outside of man, do you ascribe to the notion that this Law was, for lack of a better word, ‘created’ by God? In other words, this Moral Law is a creation of God and was created by Him in order that it may govern man. Or, is this Moral Law bred out of the necessary nature of God? In other words, from God’s nature, our morality.
While it’s been awhile since I read Lewis, from what you described, it seems as if Lewis is extrapolating a lot of his ideas from Descartes. But, I think it would be best if I understand your position a bit better before I start proffering objections as I don’t want to fall into the trap of attacking a straw-man…
I must say, though, that I’m – and I think this is true for a great many non-theists, especially – not convinced at all that there is this prescribed objective law that encompasses us all. As of now – though, for intellectual honesty’s sake, I’ll admit that my philosophical views are changing practically daily at this point. Thus, is the curse of having to read hundreds of pages of philosophy a day for school lol – I am of the impression that our moral predilections are predominantly shaped and molded by society. As such, while there is certainly a wide margin of variability as how best to achieve this, I think most people think of morality more pragmatically than you seem to be insinuating. When one thinks of morality, one typically thinks of morality in terms of how best to achieve the flourishing of mankind and how to best promote the well-being of the self and of others (please bear in mind this is a very rough intimation). Therefore, the notion of man potentially suspending morality, for whatever reason, is not really a pitfall as this almost utilitarian goal remains the same.
Oscar: great questions. Good conversation. If only there was a convenient way to change the forum from cyberspace to a place where we could grab a beer. (I wouldn’t have to wonder how you inset quotations from earlier comments – probably some nifty HTML code or something).
First of all, that was my mistake on using the phrase “loftier goal.” A better word for “goal” would have been something like “motivation” or “purpose.”
Secondly, don’t assume my argument is straight out of Lewis (though I’ve always been a fan of the guy). As a minister, I’ve got a lot of phrases and quotations from such writers and thinkers swimming around in my brain. It doesn’t hurt that Lewis addresses a very similar philosophical line of thought in Mere Christianity, which I believe both those phrases that I used comes from. However, I’m trying my best to answer you first and foremost from my own thinking.
As to the following statement you wrote and the paragraph that followed:
“I must say, though, that I’m – and I think this is true for a great many non-theists, especially – not convinced at all that there is this prescribed objective law that encompasses us all.”
My perspective and response to that is … Of course you’re not convinced. That was part of my original point. Mine is the theist’s basic belief about the nature and origin of the moral Law. Yours is the non-theist belief – that the Law of Right and Wrong (i.e. the cornerstone for this structure we call morality) emerges from the intentions, ambitions and basic desires of humankind. From my perspective, I cannot apprehend a moral Law that is the product of human thinking and striving because, philosophically speaking, such a Law would be subject to humankind – even if I myself could not control it, someone (or a group of people) must have (or have had) control over it to have established it. Thus, how could it be objectively perfect, remain common to each person, and be fairly enforced on each person? On the other side of the coin, the non-theist (and, bear in mind, I am a theist simply attempting to summarize in general terms) cannot apprehend the leap of faith – however “logically” it may be argued – that places the moral Law outside of humanity’s hands. Obviously, that would raise serious philosophical questions regarding the existence of Something beyond our material world.
This doesn’t mean the conversation must stop, of course. On the contrary, this goes to the heart of the Great Conversation. As such, I’ll put forth a brief expatiation from my (theist’s) perspective regarding your objections in a forthcoming comment…
Okay – now my perspective on the questions at hand…
It is my belief that while we do indeed learn much about morality (doing right and avoiding wrong, being charitable and resisting selfishness, etc.) from the society in which we live, society only provides an interpretation of the Law – it does not input the Law itself in our hearts and wills. For instance, if I were to have grown up in Nazi Germany or apartheid South Africa, I may very well have learned to treat people unfairly based on a racist interpretation on the specific morals that speak to what certain kinds of people are worth. Neither of us would deny that if I condemned Jewish people as worthless to society or native South Africans as inferior to my own race, I would be in the Wrong of the moral Law. It would not matter that the society in which I lived taught me differently, and with what fervor and passion and self-righteousness it taught me. Were I to come into contact with you or someone else who very rightly KNOWS that I am in the Wrong, you might endeavor to alter my personal moral view. You might even do so based on what you have learned from your own society that states all people are equal. But in endeavoring to change my morals regarding what people are worth, you would be forced to go against the society that shaped them. Therefore, society can’t be the dictator of Morality – only an agent in the interpretation and application of it, whether that interpretation be misguided or on track.
I understand your argument that most people think of morality pragmatically rather than theoretically, but are we not having a theoretical conversation regarding the philosophical origin of Morality? I think a conversation encompassing this grand thing called “Morality” must be theoretical, whereas a discussion on specific moral behavior can be more pragmatic. I, too, consider what is the moral thing to do from a pragmatic standpoint. (For instance, if I am faced with the opportunity to swipe someone’s iPad they left unattended in a coffeehouse, I don’t first theorize the nature of stealing – I simply consider the realistic wrongness of indulging in my selfishness, which always trumps the “serves them right” excuse). Considering the whole of Morality, though, is something greater.
You wrote: “When one thinks of morality, one typically thinks of morality in terms of how best to achieve the flourishing of mankind and how to best promote the well-being of the self and of others…”
On this we are in total agreement, though I project this mindset not merely to humankind, but to the “Mind” I mentioned earlier. If ever there were a purpose behind God’s “creation” of morality (as you questioned earlier), this would be it. I believe in a God who wants humankind to flourish and to promote well being within itself. I believe in a God who is both actively and passionately interested in our attention to the moral Law, and is also intentionally involved in minding the gap that comes from our occasional disregard of it.
Bo,
I’m afraid you haven’t answered the questions that I had posited. I understand that you believe in an objective morality as prescribed by God, but the intent of my questions was to probe a bit deeper so that I may fully understand your position. So, I ask again: Whence this objective morality? If it helps, I can proffer the response I most frequently encounter, so that you can have an idea of what I’m asking (bear in mind that this will be repeating what I had written in the OP):
In accordance with a strict definition of God in which He is necessarily “all-good”, His nature is such that it is perfectly good. Therefore, in accordance with this perfectly good nature, God prescribes moral edicts which reflect said perfectly good nature. Because these moral edicts are prescribed by God whose nature is perfectly good, we can be assured that this objective morality is, you guessed it, perfectly good. (This is, roughly, the response given by William Lane Craig and most apologists that I encounter.)
Now, I’m not saying that you ascribe to this particular belief, but this should give you a sense of what I’m looking for. I fully understand your position that this objective moral Law is outside of man, but I’m still not quite sure where you consider the origination of this moral Law.
I’m afraid we can only discuss the theoretical aspect of morality in relation to theism, however. The reason why I brought up the whole “pragmatic” bit was to simply say that I don’t consider there to be a theoretical aspect to morality, per se, but rather that morality should only be thought of within a pragmatic paradigm. As a metaphysical naturalist, what more is there to consider from morality aside from the pragmatic? We can certainly discuss further what I mean by this (though I think it would be easier if you asked me specific questions after you read this whole comment), but as far as I’m concerned, the discussion of “theoretical” morality only takes place within the context of talking about religion.
Lastly, I’m not sure if you completely apprehend my position with regards to morality, so I’ll just state it plainly and hope that you’ll forgive the re-iteration if what I write is what you originally considered to be my position:
Morality, properly understood, should not be thought of as a Law which all men must submit to. Therefore, morality cannot, by definition, be objectively perfect. What I mean by morality – moral acts – is actions that are carried out which adhere to a subjective belief as to what that person considers constitutes as “good”. Now, society has developed in such a way – indeed, society could not have developed any other way – that what is “good” and what is “condemnable” correlates with actions that ensure the fruition of a happy and flourishing society. There is certainly no doubt that religion played an integral role in establishing certain edicts, edicts which have been drilled into society (i.e. stances on homosexuality). For better or worse, there is no denying religion’s role in shaping how society has viewed what is good, what is moral. However, this does nothing to change the fact that “morality” is merely a pragmatic tool that we as a species use to ensure our survival. This stance still allows me to make objective moral judgments, provided that said moral judgments are predicated on my subjective view of what morality is. I am still fully capable of condemning racism, genocide, theft, rape, etc. But I do not condemn because these actions are not in accordance with some moral Law, but because these actions are a detriment to society. As it happens, irrespective of metaphysical beliefs, and as you yourself affirm, most people already have this conception of morality. The only difference is that I don’t consider this to be a law, nor do I ascribe “morality” as something that was prescribed by a deity.
Oscar: I recognize that I did not fully answer your original questions. I surrendered to the tangent and was doing my best to clarify the positions that precede the discussion of morality as objective or subjective. But, yes, let me try to supply my answer. (I warn you, it will seem very religious in outlook, but that should not come as a surprise.)
You wrote several posts up: “This Law that sort of reigns over and outside of man, do you ascribe to the notion that this Law was, for lack of a better word, ‘created’ by God? In other words, this Moral Law is a creation of God and was created by Him in order that it may govern man. Or, is this Moral Law bred out of the necessary nature of God?”
This, I believe, is the question to which you would like a straight answer. I’ll do my best, but first, I believe it must be stated that William Lane Craig and his contemporaries often err (in my humble opinion) on trying to force the argument for the existence of God (and all that comes with that argument) through a religiously-charged attack on “strong rationalism.” Thus, for the same reasons the Dawkins’s and Dennet’s and Harris’s and Hitchens’s frustrate me because of their iron-fisted appeal to the “verification principle” (I know you know what this is, but just so we’re clear, that would be the idea that belief cannot be ascribed to something until it has been proven rationally by logic or empirically by sense experience), so Craig frustrates the non-religious by only appealing to the holes he perceives in such arguments. In essence, both sides of the debate usually boil down to, “See how I can argue around this reasoning, or poke holes in that statement – thus, there is no use in believing what you believe. I win. Huzzah!” Granted, I believe this is a great place for the conversation to begin, but, as a religious person (and, specifically, as a Christian), I have a responsibility to not only argue with the non-theist stance, but to also offer reasoning FOR the existence of God, which the humble and responsible non-theist must, in the same vein, contend with.
Now, back to your original question. Did God create the moral Law? Yes … and no. Is it “bred out of the necessary nature of God?” That’s getting closer in a definitive sense, I suppose, though I struggle with the word “necessary” for several tangential reasons I won’t go into here. I don’t mean to be intentionally frustrating, nor do I wish to come across as cheeky or dance away from your question in any way. However, it is my sincere belief (and a religious one at that) that God created humankind “in his own image.” By this I mean that he made us conscious beings with free will. Did he “prescribe” a moral Law “in order that it may govern humankind?” I do not believe this is a fitting description or explanation, mainly because I believe it is not the Law that governs us (ultimately) but God who is the source of all Goodness (the Bible uses words like “righteousness” “holiness” and “steadfast faithfulness” to describe the specific characteristics of this Goodness). The moral Law of which I have written is the best way I know to describe morality – as such, I have referred to it several times as the Law of Right and Wrong. It is a way for me to illustrate the mysterious sense of Good that has been inputed within me as a being created in God’s image. But I believe this “mysterious sense of Good” is not simply a law or rule or standard for behavior – rather, it is a very real and active trace of God himself. I know, this answer reeks of religious sentiment, but this is where I begin in my reaosning FOR the existence of God – to point to the clues of him I observe through my own conscious mind. (We can talk of these “clues” – or suspicions – another time.) Thus, the deep reality is that there is no tangible Bad or Wrong category – merely the absence (in whatever measure or degree) of Good in my thoughts or actions. You can see why I can eventually arrive at a grasp of the concept of Sin – that is, the state of failure to maintain adherence to the Good we know. A lot of Christians see sin like Santa’s “Naughty or Nice” list, and God is holding the ledger. … I don’t.
There. You’ve clarified your position on what Morality is and where it comes from, and now you have mine.
Feel free to pick apart what I’ve written. However, if you’re satisfied by my answer and are ready to move on, I will indeed ask one question (since you welcomed me to do so).
You intimate that morality is subjective. I’m taking this definitively, which I assume means you think morality is dependent upon an individual’s (or perhaps a particular society’s) perception of existence … that it is tied to one’s personal feelings and opinions. In your opinion, is that a correct breakdown of what you mean by the term “subjective?”
Really enjoying the conversation. Peace.
Good! I’m glad we got that out of the way! Now, we can really get into it …
As I understand, and please correct me if I’m wrong, our morality is a, for lack of a better word, byproduct of man being created in God’s image. In other words, because God has a certain nature, and because we, as His creation, reflect that nature, our morality reflects God’s morality.
While you’ve accounted for our “morality”, this doesn’t really account for why this “morality” is “good”. It’s a standard ought-is problem. Morality, as you’ve defined it, is what is, but why ought it be this way? What about this morality that is predicated on God’s nature is “good” and, more importantly, how can you judge it to be so? You see, unfortunately, the only way you can assess the morality – the nature – of God is by making an a posteriori judgement, a judgement predicated on what you already consider to be “good”, which would simply be circular reasoning. Am I making myself clear?
Yes, I think that’s a fair assessment.
P.S. To do the quotations, you merely have to do insert the following HTML code:
[blockquote]“Whatever text you wish to quote”[/blockquote]
Replace the brackets [ and ] with respectively and there you have it.
So, you should replace the brackets with the “less-than” and “greater-than” symbols, respectively…
Oscar: Sorry for the delay in getting back to you. I’ve been away the last few days.
From what I can assess, you’re basically asking me how I can know that Morality (specifically as I attribute it to the work of God) is indeed “good.” I hope that is correct. You point out that I’ve made an a posteriori judgement. This is true, but only if the way in which I approach an understanding of Morality as “good” is through logic and reason. I know this is going to sound like a cop-out, or an attempt to dodge your question, but again I must appeal not to a logical argument to explain my belief that Morality is indeed “good,” but to faith. I believe Morality is good because I believe God is good. Why do I believe this when I have no proof – when reason cannot completely prove it? Now we get to the heart of the theist – or at least the theist who believes not only in a creative Other outside of our existence, but also that this creative Other is indeed intimately interested in his creation. I have faith. I leave the runway of reason, so to speak, and lift off in faith. I consider the clues of God that I observe in our natural world, and I accept that reason, while a vital part of the human mind and an aid to humanity’s existence, is still finite. Why do I believe Morality is good, and comes from a good God? Because I am drawn to goodness – I am haunted by it. I yearn for it, insist upon it, desire it, and experience regret, guilt, sadness and/or despair when I go against it, or when I see a lack of it in the world around me. It is as if I have been imprinted by it. I am caught up in the hope of it (“A certain ruler asked him, ‘Good teacher, what must I do to inherit eternal life?’ ‘Why do you call me good?’ Jesus answered. ‘No one is good—except God alone.’” – Luke 18:18-19).
I know it may not seem fair to bring faith into a reasoned and logical conversation, but since we are discussing the nature of God, I think it is inevitable at some point (I’m sure you would agree that if God did exist, he would stand beyond the grasp of reason alone). I hope you will forgive my appeal to faith; I am only being truthful. Having searched my mind and my heart, this is my answer.
Bo — Please don’t feel obligated to respond right away. I understand that life is rather hectic.
I don’t have a problem with a theist invoking faith, per se, but I do have a problem with a theist that has a certain belief that is merely predicated on ‘faith’. In other words, there must be at least one rational reason why you believe in God. At the risk of veering on a too far off-topic tangent, is there a rational reason as to why you believe?
I must admit, however, to be taken aback by your invoking faith in this conversation given that most ‘moral arguments’ that are proffered by theists are given for the reasons that a) theists have a rational response to the category of morality and b) non-theists do not. So, if you are going to invoke faith in this conversation, it seems rather fruitless to carry on if you self-admittedly deny to have a rationally tenable stance on the issue of morality. We could certainly talk about my position more – and I don’t mind that conversation at all – but that conversation must be taken with a grain of salt in that, yes I may come to find out that my stance on morality isn’t necessarily tenable, but you must also remember that this doesn’t mean that your stance is any better.
Oscar: I absolutely have rational reasons for belief in God. It’s just that none of these reasons offer proof – only evidence (or, as I put it in my last comment, “clues”) of a God. I think I’ve already revealed my rationality regarding the Morality argument. However, while you may view the conversation as dwelling solely in the arena of logic and reason, there are places in which we differ (of course), and I base aspects of what I believe about Morality not only on reason, but also on faith. Such would be expected of a committed, religious person.
If you would like me to offer up some of these clues – both for God’s existence in general and the Moral argument in particular (though I’ve offered some of the latter already) – I am happy to do so here or elsewhere. I just didn’t want to go on and on too long in this section, but to try to stick with the specific question at hand (though, I admit, I tend to wander into tangents).
As always, I enjoy our discussions. Peace.
Perhaps so we don’t get too tangential we should just stick to the topic of morality, for now.
I do think we differ greatly in what we consider to be justification for our particular beliefs. You’ve provided me with “rationality” (as you put it) for why you believe as you do, but I don’t think you’ve provided me with reason why said rationality should be considered to be true above all other rationalities. You must understand that I can’t simply take your word for it when you say that our morality reflects God’s nature. When pressed for why you believe this – and after showing how making such judgments were circular – you fell back on faith. I don’t mean to be antagonistic, but assertions without rational justification – justifications that don’t rely on circular reasoning or question begging – just won’t cut it for me.
Have I mentioned how glad I am that you’re blogging again, Oscar?
There’s a lot to read and ponder in the post and subsequent discussion, so if I’m repeating points, forgive me.
I think you made some pertinent corrections to John Barron’s assertions in your original post. But I think the issue that you’re pursuing with Bo is subject to much larger examinations.
You’re asking, essentially, by what standard can we declare God and morals derived from him “good”? (Correct me if I’m wrong). As you well know, the theistic perception is such that we don’t know what good is without God, whether we acknowledge it or not. This results in the apparent tautology that you cited earlier. BUT it all rests on the larger question of whether or not there is a God.
If there is a God, then the question is much like asking who created the creator? Well, it’s a good question (as is yours) but in the theistic worldview, the idea is that he is self-existent and eternal. And he is also all good, the source and measure of it, really.
If there isn’t one, then Christian morals aren’t objectively “good.” In fact, they’re no better than any other attempt at formulating a moral code, and even that classification is subject to what a society is hoping to achieve and how that morality helps them achieve it.
So does this mean we leave this question simply to faith? Not necessarily, much like Bo, I think there are some very good objective reasons for faith. But the acceptance or rejection of those necessarily form the basis for the answer to your question.
And now that I’ve joined the conversation between a minister and a well-read philosophy student, I fully expect to be politely yet thoroughly eviscerated.
Looking forward to it!
Oscar: If you haven’t accepted my rationality as better than your own, I’m not surprised. However, to say I’ve fallen back on faith assumes I’m unwilling to continue the conversation, or that I’ve cheated in some way. The simple fact remains that my worldview (whether regarding the existence of God or the nature of morality) requires both reason and faith, whereas yours only requires the latter. Julio makes a good point – we are speaking of two completely different perspectives. What you may see as circular reasoning, I see as the limitation of a rational argument. Again, this is born out of two different presuppositions. As a philosophy student, I’m sure you’re familiar with the duck/rabbit illustration, as well as the fallacy inherent within it. If you see a duck and I see a rabbit, there is only so many arguments I can make to try to get you to see it my way. And the problem remains that any argument I make is based on the presupposition that the illustration is indeed a rabbit, just as any argument you make (or question you posed) is based on the presupposition that, no, it’s a duck. This doesn’t mean the conversation must end – only that, as we share our respective viewpoints, we must not only respect each other’s perspective, but acknowledge that it takes more than a really really compelling argument (for why you should see it as a rabbit or vice versa) for a perspective to change. That can only happen in time, and with much humility as one perspective is slowly, sometimes painfully, unlearned. As far as I’m concerned, what we are on about here is a kind of “iron sharpening iron” situation; our conversation is the trading of arguments. Conviction is something we must experience on our own.
Now, in regard to your intimation that I haven’t been able to prove why morality is “good,” I feel this is an unnecessary responsibility. Perhaps I am still misunderstanding your question, though. You and I both believe that morality is concerned with what is good and what is not good. And even if we didn’t agree on that basic definition, we could (as referred to earlier) look to specific instances and situations and determine what is the good course of action and what is not. Would that – the basic empirical argument – not suffice as a suitable way to define good? As a theist and a Christian, I believe that God is good, and just and loving, and that this is the reason why moral obedience reflects such things. I believe moral obligation is ingrained within each one of us. You do not believe in, or see a need for, a God to institute goodness, justice and/or love in our world. I could ask you (and perhaps will in the future) to explain where, then, do you get your sense of moral obligation to acknowledge the rightness of what is good, just or loving. What I don’t ask is for you to define “goodness” or “justice” because we both already know quite well what is meant by the terms. Questioning their meaning is, I think, semantic, and need not be nitpicked.
Julio and Bo,
I think I may simply have been unclear thus far as to what I’m trying to get at, so I’ll try to be direct as possible.
To be clear, the reason why this topic interests me so much is because I, as a non-theist, am frequently charged with the claim that I cannot account for an objective morality. Well, firstly, I don’t believe there is an objective morality. But, for the sake of argument, I grant the premise that there does indeed exist an objective morality. Given this new paradigm, I want to counter with saying that the theist also cannot account for an objective morality anymore than the non-theist. Perhaps this is the reason why we don’t seem to be getting very far. Perhaps you don’t believe you can account for an objective morality? Perhaps you take it on faith? If you do, that’s fine with me. Like I said, I don’t necessarily have a problem with theist’s faith. My problem faith arises when either a) the theist’s belief in God is solely predicated on faith, or b) when the theist charges me with something that he himself can sustain either. Well, in case you do believe that you can account for an objective morality, I proffer the following:
I think it is fair to say that we equate “acting morally” to acting in such a way that it corresponds to what we consider “good”. For the purposes of this conversation, the fact that we would probably act the same way when confronted with a moral choice is irrelevant. What I want to get at is why you consider this act to be good. Bo, you said, “As a theist and a Christian, I believe that God is good, and just and loving, and that this is the reason why moral obedience reflects such things.” Avoiding the attribution of “good” for now, let us grant God is indeed “just” and “loving”. Indeed, I never ask a theist to deny this. But why are “just” and “loving” characteristics that one would consider to be “good”? I fully concede that being just and loving are indeed characteristics that should be exemplified within a person. Let’s just take “loving” for simplicity’s sake. The theist says that “love” is an attribution that is part of God’s nature. Fine, I’ll grant that. But simply because it is part of God’s nature does not mean that “loving” is necessarily good. To say otherwise, to say that “loving” is good because it reflects God’s nature, renders it a meaningless tautology. It would thus mean that whatever God’s nature happened to be would be good necessarily by definition. I suspect if God’s nature would be one that murders every other child that were born, you wouldn’t say that this characteristic is good. No, I suspect that you would appeal to some other source for morality. Furthermore, you must take it on complete faith – at this, I don’t think there should be any objection – that God’s nature is indeed the nature that is reflected in the Bible. You must wholly take it on faith that God is not a liar and that the Bible was not merely the fabrication of a bored God.
And just as a preemptive, let us consider the theistic response that God’s nature wouldn’t be one that killed every other child that was born. Well, why not? More importantly, why is this nature of gratuitous slaughter not ok? After all, if we are defining morality by God’s nature, it shouldn’t matter what God’s nature is, simply that it is. The fact that one is uncomfortable with God’s nature being one of wanton murder indicates – to me at least – that there is a source outside of God’s nature that is appealed to for our source of morality.
My point in all this is this: I suspect that most theists don’t actually appeal to God’s nature for their source of morality, but rather appeal to the same source as I do (aside from some obvious exceptions): simply the flourishing of a happy and healthy society. Basing morality off of what would best achieve this objective seems to me what most people actually consider to be their source of morality.
Oscar: I fully recognize what you’re asking now, but I can’t say I understand it. I can see why, philosophically speaking, you might want to continue to break down the morality argument by deconstructing what the word “good” means, or trying to unchain concepts like justice and love from being “good.” No offense, but why deconstruct something you yourself do not believe?
If you concede that justice and love are characteristics that should be exemplified, is that not because they are “good”? Why else would you feel they should be exemplified? What is a better reason? Because society would beneit from such virtues? If so, how would you describe that society? Would you call it a good one … or a bad one? My point is, even if you want to separate such virtues from necessarily being “good,” your own understanding of them prevents you from doing so. This is what I mean when I say that the concept of Good and Bad (what I have referred to as the standard of the moral Law) is ingrained upon each of us, no matter where we believe it comes from.
Yes. Exactly. God is the standard. He is good. He is not only the mind behind justice, love and all other good things, but the creator of them as well. And, as creator, he claims to embody all of these things perfectly (a brief but illuminative statement from Scripture is 1 John 4:16 – “And so we know and rely on the love God has for us. God is love. Whoever lives in love lives in God, and God in them.”) I concede that I don’t consciously appeal to the character of God each time I consider a moral action. But I disagree with you that that means I base my understanding of Good and Bad on something outside of God’s existence. Whether or not I consciously acknowledge God when I act (or fail to act) morally has no bearing on God being the source of that standard.
As I was typing this up through multiple interruptions, I noticed that Bo has beat me to a response. I think we address some unique points, so I haven’t varied my original line of thought much. However, please forgive any redundancies between the two.
That said,
Just to clarify, I think there might be an issue with how we use the term objective. There is the manner in which we talk about the “objective” reasons for faith, the externally verifiable arguments that apologists usually give. Then there is the idea that we have “objective” moral values as independently existing ones.
For the former definition applied to morality, C. S. Lewis, Francis Collins and others have cited a perceived universal moral law as at least part of their call to faith. However, it was not necessarily part of mine nor have I read their writings recently enough to expound on that concept in a very sophisticated manner other than “yeah, I think so, too.” Since the two specifically named are quite a bit smarter than me, I’ll not concede the point, but admit to being unprepared to discuss it at length. However, I feel comfortable leaving it for now, because I suspect that the arguments being profferred to you in these other discussions you mentioned have more to do with another issue entirely.
The debate, as I’ve often encountered it recently, usually frames objective vs. subjective in an more of a comparison of standards. For example, the argument is a favorite of apologists to use against Christopher Hitchens who, in his love of prose and polemic, often phrased his arguments in terms of supreme moral absolutes. Like his challenge that Christ’s redemptive death was immoral. Religion is evil. Etc…Inevitably, the response of either his opponent or an antagonistic audience member would eventually be: “on what basis?” To paraphrase Doug Wilson’s take on naturalistic morality, “if we’re all just atoms banging around, a complex series of biochemical reactions, what is the meaning of good or moral?” It’s that conversation stopper that John Barron alluded to and tried to circumvent in his first post. How do we make absolute pronouncements on such matters if they are subject to variance between cultures or even individuals? Of course, the argument is never meant to imply that atheists cannot behave morally, but rather meant to call into question the basis for their intrinsic sense of morality and, in some cases, boisterous proclamations made on moral grounds.
Whether or not it’s verifiable (again, I feel it is, but I’m in no position to defend it at the moment), theists proclaim their morality is objective as it is measured by an external, transcendent standard, unchanged by time and or societal whim, provided by the One who made us and everything else.
So theistic morality is objective as opposed to a subjective and potentially fluid morality that you’ve posited as a possibility.
If these are attributes of God, divorcing them from his goodness is impossible under Christian theology. In this perspective, it’s not just that God is good in an sort of descriptive manner, but God IS good in a definitive, existential manner. He is the standard and source of it. We would not know good (or existence, for that matter) without God.
Even if Christians appeal to the same source that you do, the idea is that source wouldn’t recognize morality without God in the first place. While seemingly tautological, again, the pertinent question at hand then is whether or not there is a God in the first place.
WOW! I really blew the blockquote formatting!
*hangs head in shame*
@Bo
Simply because I don’t believe in something doesn’t mean it’s not beneficial for me to break down the philosophical/metaphysical principles of the theist. It’s why I study Philosophy in the first place.
On the one hand, I break down such principles so that I may show myself that certain principles are not tenable to support. On the other hand, once I have adequately shown myself why it would be wrong to believe in such principles, I explicate it to others so that, ideally, my explication will allow others to see my reasoning, or even to point out the flaw in my reasoning. Isn’t that why we have these discussions? I’m not sure I understand the question.
I concede that justice and love are good not because they are inherently good, but because they objectively promote a thriving and flourishing society. Concepts such as love and justice have no inherent nominal value – which, given your particular position, you may not agree with – unless there are those to give such qualities value. As such, not only must there be those to give these qualities values, but there must also be a reason why these qualities are valued. “Value” is always subjective. What is valuable to you may not necessarily be valuable to me, and vice versa. When you talk about “value”, you must realize that value is a term that is, almost by definition, subjective.This is why I don’t think my position is at all contradictory. I value concepts like love and justice because they are the means by which a happy society may flourish, this flourishing, of course, being the end I wish to see. Furthermore, I think it’s safe to say that this end is something that most people want. Now, there may be disagreements as to how to best achieve this, but the fact remains that most have the same subjective goal. This is why I can objectively value love and justice, so long as it is understood that these objective values are predicated on a subjective paradigm. So, I wouldn’t consider society “good”, properly understood, as this would connote that society – and its byproducts – are inherently and objectively good. This is not the case. We are a naturally social creature. While it’s still metaphysically speculative as to how modern society arose, one thing that cannot be denied is that we are social creature and that society was something that was bound to happen. Given our biological imperative for the propagation of our species, and given the foregone conclusion of society, it stands to reason to ascertain the means by which we can best optimize society.
–
I couldn’t help but notice that you did not address any of the complications that I proffered in my previous comment. I’ll simply copy and paste:
Let’s just take “loving” for simplicity’s sake. The theist says that “love” is an attribution that is part of God’s nature. Fine, I’ll grant that. But simply because it is part of God’s nature does not mean that “loving” is necessarily good. To say otherwise, to say that “loving” is good because it reflects God’s nature, renders it a meaningless tautology. It would thus mean that whatever God’s nature happened to be would be good necessarily by definition. I suspect if God’s nature would be one that murders every other child that were born, you wouldn’t say that this characteristic is good. No, I suspect that you would appeal to some other source for morality. Furthermore, you must take it on complete faith – at this, I don’t think there should be any objection – that God’s nature is indeed the nature that is reflected in the Bible. You must wholly take it on faith that God is not a liar and that the Bible was not merely the fabrication of a bored God.
And just as a preemptive, let us consider the theistic response that God’s nature wouldn’t be one that killed every other child that was born. Well, why not? More importantly, why is this nature of gratuitous slaughter not ok? After all, if we are defining morality by God’s nature, it shouldn’t matter what God’s nature is, simply that it is. The fact that one is uncomfortable with God’s nature being one of wanton murder indicates – to me at least – that there is a source outside of God’s nature that is appealed to for our source of morality.
@Julio
I feel like much of what I said in my response to Bo applies here, as well. I claim objective moral values all the time, just like Hitchens did (though perhaps not as boisterously). Once we establish what it is that should be valued – which is, irrespective of metaphysical beliefs, always subjective – there are objective means by which we can best achieve our goal. If I place value in becoming a world-renowned pianist, there are objective means by which I can best achieve this: practice meticulously, study music theory, etc. Similarly, if I place value in the flourishing of society, there are objective means by which I can best achieve this: promoting justice, general love and empathy for fellow man, etc. Be it consciously or sub-consciously, I suspect that most all people place value in the flourishing of society. This is why Hitchens and the like are able to say that, objectively, religion is evil. (Now, whether this assertion is right is another matter entirely. What concerns us here is the ability to say this.) If Hitchens truly believed that religion produced a net negative effect on society, which I suspect that he did indeed believe this, then he is well within his right to proffer his assertions on an objective basis.
@Bo and Julio:
In order to understand this, we must first realize what it means to value. First there must be a reason, a purpose, for something to be valuable. The American flag is not inherently valuable, a ring is not inherently valuable, I qua human am not inherently valuable. The American flag is valuable because of its symbolic representation of the United State, a ring may be valuable because it signifies an engagement, if I am valuable for whatever reason, we then, and only then, can say that these things are valued. It necessarily follows that there must be a subject to whom these things are valuable. An engagement ring obviously cannot be valued for its sentimental value if it’s not sentimental for someone. Presumably, the prospective bride and groom would value that engagement rings because it signifies the life-long commitment that they will make to one another.
Now, let us apply this to certain moral attributions – namely, love and justice. Let us suppose a theistic paradigm:
First, it would be nonsensical for me to say that I value love and justice simply because those are God’s attribution, this answers nothing as to why we value something. So, we have two options here then: 1) We could say that we value love and justice because it promotes a healthy society (really, any human reasoning would do), but then this negates the necessity for God. If we value certain moral concepts simply because it benefits something for us, then God is necessarily not the source. 2) We shift the predicate of the valued to God. This latter option seems the most tenable position if you wish to claim that our source of morality is God Himself.
So, given the conditions of value above, what is the reason why God values such concepts as love and justice? Because it benefits his creation (us)? Again, we come back to negating the necessity for God as even my position is that love and justice is valuable because it benefits mankind. Because God’s nature is loving and just? This seems the only remaining logical conclusion. But this response doesn’t seem very good either. This would make the value of love and justice arbitrary, necessarily contingent on what God’s nature happened to be. This is – without even being facetious – akin to me saying that I value the number 21 because I am 21. I value hair because I have a luscious head of hair. etc. So while you may hold the position that God’s nature is that of love and justice, this does nothing to explain to me – or anyone – why love and justice are actually good. To finish, I would, once again, simply like to copy and past what I have already written twice before:
Let’s just take “loving” for simplicity’s sake. The theist says that “love” is an attribution that is part of God’s nature. Fine, I’ll grant that. But simply because it is part of God’s nature does not mean that “loving” is necessarily good. To say otherwise, to say that “loving” is good because it reflects God’s nature, renders it a meaningless tautology. It would thus mean that whatever God’s nature happened to be would be good necessarily by definition. I suspect if God’s nature would be one that murders every other child that were born, you wouldn’t say that this characteristic is good. No, I suspect that you would appeal to some other source for morality. Furthermore, you must take it on complete faith – at this, I don’t think there should be any objection – that God’s nature is indeed the nature that is reflected in the Bible. You must wholly take it on faith that God is not a liar and that the Bible was not merely the fabrication of a bored God.
And just as a preemptive, let us consider the theistic response that God’s nature wouldn’t be one that killed every other child that was born. Well, why not? More importantly, why is this nature of gratuitous slaughter not ok? After all, if we are defining morality by God’s nature, it shouldn’t matter what God’s nature is, simply that it is. The fact that one is uncomfortable with God’s nature being one of wanton murder indicates – to me at least – that there is a source outside of God’s nature that is appealed to for our source of morality.
Honestly! Don’t you have papers to write?! :p
Seriously, what sucks about this conversation is that I’m going to come up with or come across the perfect response to your line of questioning about 3 or 4 weeks after we’ve all moved on.
Until then, my head’s been stuck in evidential apologetics, among other things, so I have to apologize for my seemingly simplistic explanation on the matter. However, once one arrives at the conclusion that there is a God (the Christian one at that), we take for granted that he is the source of morality and it is good. The reason being, as I admitted, is the fact that he is THE definition of what we would call “good” in that worldview.
In other words, I’m directly disagreeing with this. In the Christian worldview, at least. That we can recognize the benefits in the results that moral behavior produces is not surprising or refuting of the Christian idea of goodness as God allegedly has our best interest in mind. Even though, you’ve dismissed this conjecture already as negating the need for God.
So, it’s not that I’ve ignored your thrice-repeated challenged, but that I’ve answered it with the admission that it could be seen as a tautology. In other words, you’re asking the theist to define the definition. If he happens to be wrong about God, then it certainly is a meaningless tautology. If there is a God, then the presuppositional challenge stands. You can’t know or define good without God, just as none of us could define reality or existence without him.
And if his nature happened to be different, so would our perception of morality in your hypothetical situation. Thankfully, it’s not in God’s nature to do these terrible things that you’ve suggested we consider. However if we must consider the scenario, the only response I can give is that, under the construct of theism, if we hypothetically existed in a reality that was created by such a God that did value such atrocities, then we wouldn’t, couldn’t really know the difference. But we don’t, we posit that our existence is ruled by a God who values love, justice and other moral behaviors and, far from being subject to a capricious deity, his nature is immutable and eternal.
On its own, I understand that this isn’t the most satisfactory answer, but given my understanding of theology (and poor exposition of it) that’s the explanation we have. The question then must be whether or not the God of the Bible exists.
And I do get what you’re trying to arrive at. It’s just that you’re questioning the theist definition of “good” independent of weighing in on the validity or truth of its source. It’s like discussing the redemptive power of Jesus’ sacrifice outside of the acceptance of Christianity. And since you’ve embraced a view of morality as subjective, it’s hard to argue much on the idea of a universal sense of morality.
Otherwise, I’ll grant that you’ve elucidated a very cogent theory of morality in the absence of God. Also, I hope I’ve made it clear that I was quoting the debate arguments and not positing them for myself. I understand how Hitchens and other could make absolute statements as they do based on the agreed upon set of values that we share as a society. So I don’t immediately preclude such criticisms. However, they do take on a certain invalidity once aimed outside of the societal structure they were formed under if not based on a broader, even transcendent, definition of right and wrong.
And, as a side note, when I get through my current pile of books, I’ll try to formulate a more thoughtful answer over at my blog if you refer me to some of the works you’re basing your arguments on. It’s a great discussion that I’d love to continue or revisit at some point. But I’m honestly ill-equipped to do so much further for now.
Bo, you’re up!
BLOCKQUOTE WORKED!
*does elaborate victory dance*
P.S. I fixed your blockquote mishap, Julio.
Thanks! I promise to leave text formatting to the experts from now on!
Sorry, but something just occurred to me. Out of curiosity, since you’re questioning the theistic standards of good, may I prod your reasoning a little bit:
All of us involved here are products of Western civilization so we all take this for granted. But why does love and justice produce a happy society? Further, why is a happy society “good” or desirable? Why wouldn’t a more competitive and cutthroat environment be preferable? Certainly none of us would think so, but if approached with such a value system, what would a naturalistic, subjective moralist have to say in response?
I’m not exactly sure how you would have already arrived at this conclusion, Julio. I submit to you that this same reasoning could be applied to most any of the arguments that are used for the existence of God, thus rendering belief in God a belief solely predicated on faith. The Moral Argument for the existence of God – as this is essentially what we’ve been discussing thus far – is used to prove existence. If I understand you correctly, you want to say, then, that we can claim an objective morality because we already know that God exists? This then leads me to ask what other things are explained already because God exists? More importantly, what arguments do you have for the existence of God, if you are not relying on arguments such as the Moral Argument? I’ve been assuming the discussion thus far was using morality as a means to prove God – which is what I believe Bo is arguing for. The couple of paragraphs that proceed the passage that I cited above is arguing under the presumption we can know morality because we know God exists, which is not the claim that I’ve been critiquing. If this indeed is the assertion that you’re proffering, I think we should continue with the two questions above.
Thanks!
I’m more than willing to revisit this topic anytime! I don’t know, though, if I would be able to simply give you the titles of a couple of books to help you understand my position, as I’m really basing my theory off of a lot of material such as: Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, a few works by Marx but mainly his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, a bunch of other works by authors like Aristotle and Rousseau who discuss what it means to be a member of this species, etc, and also a little evolutionary biology. Sorry I couldn’t be more help in that department. =/ Maybe if you were looking to read a more specific topic?
Ah very good questions!
Well, first, I don’t think it would be that much of a leap of logic to think that a society in which everyone was unhappy would not be able to last very long. I say happiness is desirable because it is what seems to produce the best results. Now, why not a more cutthroat environment? Well, I suppose I would have to inquire in what way you mean this to be? If we are talking about animalistic patterns – survival of the fittest – in which we would have to be constantly wary of our lives, then this doesn’t at all seem to be the best way to propagate the species. If we are more fixated on mere survival, then where does advancement in medicine, technology, or general science fit in? Furthermore, we are able to recognize that we work better as a cooperative rather than pursuing individualistic and selfish desires. Mere survival doesn’t seem best. Now, if we are talking about being less empathetic in general as a society, then I would simply have to respond with: we are empathetic simply because can be empathetic. Our society is in a position in which we don’t have to be consumed with ensuring every minutia of resource to ensure our own survival. We are able to recognize that we have excess and that others are lacking. Furthermore, we have evolved to care for the other members of our species, our group, our tribe. Couple our biological predisposition for empathy with the fact that we are in a position to actually be empathetic, there doesn’t seem to be any rational reason why we wouldn’t be empathetic. Sure, we could be more cut-throat, but even animal species show empathetic actions towards other members of their herd.
And I’m finally back. Apologies for the absence – I’ve been dealing with final interviews for a job, inputing salary into a monthly budget, and exploring moving expenses. The fun never ends…
@Oscar and Julio:
You guys have been rather busy without me, so I’m not quite sure which end of the pool to jump back in. Forgive me if the following seems like I’m picking and choosing what to respond to – I’m simply offering my thoughts on what seemed the most in-depth aspects of the conversation thus far.
@Oscar:
This refers to a question that I have since left unasked because I felt it would be seen as trying to change the subject. However, I feel we can explore it now, even as we continue to converse on related lines of logic. The question is: If human beings are merely the products of evolution, which operates by way of a “survival of the fittest” relationship with our environment, how do we even explain the concept of “happiness”? Is happiness merely an instinctual sense of contentment (I am healthy, I am fed, I am safe from predators, etc.)? Or when we converse here of “happiness” are we talking about something more than mere animalistic safety? I ask this only because I feel it makes no rational sense that humans – if we are merely the product of evolution – would “value” (to use your word, Oscar) a sense of “happiness.” To value happiness seems irrelevant to survival. Now, I have heard the arguments for an evolutionary sense of morality, but such explanations of a natural instinct of right and wrong seem to halt at the propagation of the species. Where does happiness come in? How can that be explained through completely naturalistic logic?
Perhaps, but in the animal kingdom, once the herd itself is severely threatened, the weaker ones (specifically the ones to which, occasionally, are shown empathy) are left to fend for themselves. A biological predisposition? Okay, nice term, but how did that come about? How, evolutionarily speaking, did a “feeling” (for lack of a better word) that so often promotes self-sacrifice, or at least puts self-preservation on hold, ever endure in the human creature?
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Earlier in the conversation, Oscar asked (or, more specifically, you reiterated) the question of whether or not a God who slaughtered every other child would be considered good if we indeed get our sense of goodness directly from the character of God. I agree with Julio that, as horrible as it sounds to we who value love and justice and mercy, we indeed would see such atrocious characteristics as good. But I want to add that, in this line of logic, “good” still remains nothing more than a term slapped onto specific examples of behaviorial inclinations. In other words, the logic of this argument demands we manipulate our belief in the characteristics of an omnipotent, omniscient God (despite evidences to the contrary, only one of which – Morality – we have discussed thus far) while remaining steadfast in our own understanding of what is “good.” Thus, we can shift who God is all around as much as we like, but we still get to judge this hypothetical deity we have reconstructed based on a fixed, immovable concept – what is “good.” Ergo, the concept of good becomes eternal, and the belief in God becomes malleable. In my opinion, it appears we have run into a fallacy with this line of logic.
There’s more to respond to, of course, but I’ll let these thoughts stand on their own for now. Peace.
I’m sorry if I’ve misunderstood. The assertions in John Barron’s original and your response(s) above say nothing of arriving at the conclusion of God’s existence through the Moral Argument. Your question seemed to be centered more on the idea that Theists can critique naturalistic moral systems on the basis of their being subjective, unaffixed to any standard but the individual (or at widest, a society).
I very cautiously made the distinction between objective as independently verifiable and objective as fixed and external, the latter generally the claim that I’ve encountered lately in such debates and definitely the approach that John was discussing.
So in my reading (and admitted misreading) of your inquiry, the question has somewhat evolved from, under the theistic worldview, “why is morality objective?” (I answered that God is fixed and external to our contrived systems of morality) to “why is theistic morality necessarily good?” (in the theistic paradigm, it derives from God who is our definition and standard of good, whether we acknowledge him or not) to “can morality prove God exists?”
To which I preemptively responded earlier:
While presupposing God gives us why theists feel like they have an objective and “good” sense of morality, in other words why we can trust the source of it, we must work in the opposite direction for the Moral Argument. Which is why I’d like to revisit the topic later. Considering the weight and frequency of its use to argue for God and my lack of critical engagement with it, I feel I owe it and its counterarguments some deeper consideration before I try to expound upon it in a meaningful manner. And I’ll stand by that for now. Although, I am incredibly grateful for this exchange as it has (even earlier than this point) underscored a blindspot in my studies. While I was examining some of the more evidential arguments, I have given this one short-shrift.
Having been a Christian yourself for a number of years, I’m afraid I have nothing terribly new to present. I would remind you that the case for faith is a cumulative one. Here’s my best shot at a comprehensive answer in a relatively short space:
The cosmological argument and the anthropic principle I feel provide a compelling argument for a deity, however generic. The historical arguments for Christianity provide a clarification of who that deity might be. And then there are the ubiquitous yet less definable subjective reasons. Unlike many Christians, I’m not one to plaster my “testimony” all over the internet. Nor have I seen anything like visions, heard voices, etc… But what I have seen is purpose in matters over which I have no control, purpose that follows curiously close to what the Bible would tell us and has guided me over and over again to the same answers. Blessings I could not have even thought to ask for, but which were perfect in their timing. Purpose and growth through struggles that I couldn’t overcome on my own. And, while it would be hard to convince you of this, these answers where not always searched for or superimposed. You’d have to know me and my circumstances better to come to that conclusion on your own, so for now you’ll have to take my word on it.
And when I calculate the sum total of the unlikelihood and non-necessity of our universe’s formation, of its formation in such a way that life of any sort should arise, of my own life and its experiences and then factor in the life and ministry of Jesus (including his resurrection) I become firmly convinced of what I claim to be my faith.
Generic, I know. But you asked.
Onto your response to my other question:
Thank you for your answer. I was rather unspecific (sorry) and I did mean something more like your latter definition of my use of the term “cutthroat”. However, I feel that your explanation for that is a bit circular. We are empathetic because we can be? Does that relieve us of the duty if we somehow find ourselves in more dire straits, then?
But moreover, the question wasn’t why we, as a Western society, have developed the evolutionary problematic trait of altruism, but if faced with a society that lacks it, do we have grounds to respond. For example, if another society systematically withheld resources from the sick, disabled or otherwise infirm in order to conserve such resources for more “fit” members of society, any naturalist in their right mind would, of course, respond in anger and outrage in compassion for the victims of such policies. But if morals are based on respective societal values, on what grounds do we have to criticize or react? Besides our common Western values of human dignity and right to life, what evokes this response? In the absence of some universal morality, would it amount to simply an impulse of cultural hegemony?
@ Bo – I’ve been a silent reader of your blog for a few months after having found it through Oscar’s site (right before you went on hiatus, in fact) and I am very excited to hear of the developments you mentioned in your last comment. Good luck with all of it! I’ll be praying for you guys!
@Bo
I suppose, in this context, I mean “happiness” to mean something more than mere satiation. I fear you may be thinking of “survival of the fittest” in a rather harsh and narrow sense, more akin to brute naturalistic-survival settings. Why should we not consider “happiness” in terms of our survival? As I already stated, “happiness” has a rather apparent benefit to the propagation of the species. When we consider that other animals show acts of kinship towards other members of their species, that we can observe relationships between parents and their offspring, that we can see, in the context of apes, silver backs protect their herd from outside harm, we get a very real sense that other animals do indeed experience – at the very least on the instinctual level – certain characteristics which would lead to happiness. Let us just take ‘kinship’ as an example. It cannot be denied that kinship in humans is a great source of happiness. It also cannot be denied that other members of the animal kingdom also display acts of kinship. While I’m not quite sure if animals are cognizant of the fact that ‘kinship’ is something that is worthy of value, or if kinship necessarily translates into the chemical reactions that produce pleasure (though, I would argue that dogs do indeed experience happiness from their kinship with their owners) it should be apparent that ‘kinship’ has great benefit in terms of survival: group dynamics are always better for survival.
What I am trying to get at is the fact that there are certain paradigms which are known to produce “happiness”. Now, it is also evident that we have developed inherent instincts to aide us in our survival, ones which translate into specific emotions; as an example, consider the fact that we have inherent in us a certain tentativeness when exploring new and uncertain areas. This tentativeness we feel when confronting anything that would not be beneficial to our survival we attribute the emotion “fear”. Anything that would controvert our survival we tag on the emotion of fear – facing down the barrel of a gun; walking across a busy highway blindfolded; even losing a job, while it would not directly affect our survival, we still fear it because of it would impact our capacity to survive, it indirectly affects our survival. In the same manner, things which aide our survival we experience the emotion of “happiness”. Kinship was already used, but this can be attributed to many things: safety, love (which can either be between family and would therefore benefit solidarity or between a partner which would benefit propagation, etc.); more pragmatically, satiation of hunger, safety from the elements, etc.
Now, I’m not exactly sure which species you are thinking of when you say that, “in the animal kingdom, once the herd itself is severely threatened, the weaker ones (specifically the ones to which, occasionally, are shown empathy) are left to fend for themselves.” A good rule of thumb to remember is that, when trying to compare humans to other members of the animal kingdom, it is best to use apes as we are the most closely related. Anyway, the herd dynamic of gorillas especially is such that they are very protective of the weaker ones. The silver back – the dominant – protects the whole group, the mothers protect their offspring. We see cases of protection all over the animal kingdom – most notably when observing mothers protecting their offspring. While it is certainly true that in the direst of situations the weaker ones are left to fend for themselves, can we not say that this is also true in humans? A couple of compelling examples that I would highly recommend reading is Primo Levi’s accounts of his survival of Auschwitz (really, anything he wrote on the subject is a compelling read). It is hard to conceptualize pure survival scenarios because we very rarely experience them. But I put to you that, with few exceptions, humans are, with very few differences, no different than the rest of the animal kingdom when it comes to pure live-or-die situations.
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I commend your ability at least remain intellectually honest with your beliefs and firmly adhere to its logical implications – very few theists that I’ve spoken with have been unable or un-willing to do this. I’ll respond more fully in a bit.
@Julio
If it’s important, could you perhaps explain this a bit more?
I think there is a distinction that needs to be made. I’ve attempted to explicate it, but I don’t think I was clear as I had hoped I was.
First, I would say, yes, the society which you just described are very well within their right to distribute resources in such an in-humane manner.
Secondly, and I want to make this abundantly clear, I – and everyone else who thinks like me, which, presumably, would be a vast majority of the human population – am within my right to condemn their actions.
While I do believe morality is predicated on the subjective paradigm of human fruition, I also believe that this should be how everyone approaches morality. This does not negate, however, the fact that someone else is able to hold a different belief. An apt analogy would be the theist/non-theist paradigm. You believe that I am wrong with my philosophical beliefs, you may even secretly criticize said beliefs (don’t try and deny it!
), but you still recognize my right to hold the positions that I do, however wrong they may be.
@Bo and Julio
First, I would like to apologize for any confusion thus far with regards to the specific topic at hand. It’s hard to keep somewhat disjointed conversations separated in your head when they’re occurring in the same thread…
Since it seems we’re deviating from proving the existence of God by the Moral Argument, we can just drop it for now.
Now, both of you have expressed that the source of our morality is indeed God, but that this nature of God may indeed have been malleable when considering possibilities of said nature. “Ergo, the concept of good becomes eternal, and the belief in God becomes malleable.” (I do not mean to say that God’s nature is malleable, but can be considered as such when we think about the source of our morality and the possibilities of what this morality may have looked like.)
I suppose the main thing that I wish to accomplish now is to simply demonstrate that the theistic take on morality is predicated on faith (which, as I’ve said before, if perfectly fine) and that, given this faith-based foundation, the theist cannot levy a charge against a non-theist for not being able to adequately explain morality.
Thus far, hopefully, I’ve been able to articulate my position without committing too many errors and have, to the best of my abilities, explicated the foundation for my moral judgments. However, I feel as if our moral foundation, as articulated by the two of you, has been submitted as simply a tautology (our morality reflects God’s nature). While this may be the case (indeed, to even attack this claim, we would have to consider God’s existence in its totality, which is a much grander subject matter than the one at hand), it remains to be seen why I should adhere to this moral framework. We are currently at an impasse, you believe your moral framework to be accurate, I believe my moral framework to be accurate, but how do we settle this contention? At least within my moral framework, I am able to say that this directly impacts our survival in the best way possible. But what argument can be proffered from a tautology? There is no reason for me to consider this framework; less so if I find many faults with this framework, which I undoubtedly do.
Furthermore, if God’s nature is indeed immutable, then one would expect, to see a somewhat consistent take on what is considered to be moral (allowing, of course, for deviation as a result of sin). But this is not what we witness. What we witness throughout history is an evolution of moralistic thought.
As an example, we can simply take societal structures. Our moralistic thought has evolved from a dominating patriarchy with preferential treatment on one race/culture (i.e. preference given to the Jews which somehow came to mean Western society), to gradually including members of other races and culture, to gradually placing women on an egalitarian status, and finally, to gradually placing homosexuals on an egalitarian status (most of these changes, I hope you agree, have not even been fully realized). Rather than directing man from the beginning with clear edicts that a certain societal construct is how it should be, we see edicts given that connote perhaps the exact opposite. If societal constructs, as it pertains to egalitarianism is trending towards what God had wanted, then why did we not have the views that we do now, back in the OT? In other words, if our morality does indeed reflect God’s nature, then it stands to reason that our views on social acceptance should have been present from the outset. What is worse is the fact that the Ancient Greco-Romans, who were contemporaries of the Jews of the OT, were more accepting of homosexuals. What we see in the OT is a sharp regress in terms of societal acceptance. How can it be that the heathens of ancient Greece and Rome reflected more of today’s society than did the Jews in the OT who were guided by the one true God?
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In retrospect I can see where you were trying to lead to the topic of the Moral Argument. My apologies for not picking up on it and being better prepared to discuss the topic.
In fact, I totally sympathize with your struggle to keep all these threads straight. I’m beginning to lean towards Bo’s earlier suggestion of having this conversation over a pint somewhere. (Pffft…”beginning”). So out of the midst of the various points you’ve just made in response to our multitude of points, I’m going to dive in and try to formulate a response.
You say that despite the fact that we are able to hold different beliefs despite arriving at them through the same naturalistic processes. That does not, however, explain why we have any right to criticize another set of moral values (especially if we are to ACT on those criticisms). With theism vs. atheism, we can weigh the precepts, assertions and evidence (yes, evidence) to determine the truth between two mutually exclusive claims. How do we, in a subjectively-determined moral paradigm, effectively compare systems to one another? There might be a few agreed upon “objective” points. And even that is arguable because if a society replaces the goal of “happiness” with “power”, their approach to morality will accordingly change. Maybe I’m being difficult, but when primarily dependent on cultural influences, it seems as though you might as well be criticizing differences in musical tastes or forms of art, especially if the abuses are solely internal.
Yet discussions of international humanitarian crises, of abuses of the weak and defenseless by totalitarian regimes, aren’t couched in terms of mere differences of opinion. We see a real push not only for positive aid for the victims but for punitive measures for the perpetrators. Maybe you don’t think such responses are warranted, at least the punitive ones?
Take for example the jailing of the Indonesian atheist that you wrote about. If morals are subjectively determined and generally formed by societal norms, why should we care about that man’s plight? Not only was he acting against his society’s general moral values, but he was breaking an explicitly codified law. As a lover of religious (yes, even irreligious) freedom, I am appalled at this case, but if our rights as individuals are simply determined by whichever culture we were raised in, then my criticisms of the situation are frivolous.
Now we’re heading into territory where you, a philosophy major, will have a bit (*cough*) of an advantage over me. My historical analysis of morality will be somewhat underwhelming for the time being, but I will do my best to answer:
By my vague recollection of it, the claim of the Moral Argument is that we actually do see a consistency in morality through the ages and various moral codes. For very general examples: Murder, rape, theft are pretty consistently reviled. The keeping of marriage vows and the honoring of parents are consistently praised. There are also important deviations, such as the methods of enforcement of such laws, but the overall values remain the same.
Now given your example, I can understand why you’d favorably compare the Greco-Roman moral codes to Judaism and declare the former more progressive. But, based on my admittedly spotty knowledge of those societies, I think your view of those societies is a bit too rosy and your comparison a bit too narrow. For example, to counterbalance your praise of their treatment of homosexuals, infanticide was pretty rampant in Roman society. If the child was unwanted for any reason (including being the wrong gender), it was left to die of exposure.
Furthermore, Christian scholars tend to note (Paul Copan and Philip Yancey being two that I remember off-hand) that Mosaic laws were a vast improvement over their contemporaries, limiting the “damages” collected for various offenses (Eye for an eye sounds harsh, but some ancient cultures sought the death penalty for analogous injuries) and the prohibition of human sacrifice to name a couple of points. While the various complaints against OT morality need more addressing than I can do here, overall, the general direction of ancient morality has been moved forward because of (or at least have been predated by) Judeo-Christian values.
The points above are a bit shakier than I’d like them to be, so I probably won’t have much more to contribute at this point, but I will return to the subject at some point in the not too distant future. Thank you for the challenge and extraordinary patience both with the argumentation and the delay in responses!
Seriously…I’m always up for alcohol/philosophical discussions. Honestly, that’s how I spend half my time here at the university lol. (No, but seriously…) Now, we just have to figure out how to get everyone in the same area at the same time.
I think I understand your question better now and hopefully I’ll be able to answer it satisfactorily,. So, let’s just build on the example you proffered and think of two societies which have constructed their moral paradigms differently: one society who’s ultimate concern is power for the mere sake of power and the other who’s ultimate concern is human flourishing. While I grant that both paradigms are ultimately subjective, I would contend that the latter’s paradigm is the most pragmatic and, ultimately, the only one that is tenable. While there may be no ultimate purpose, man – indeed, any species – is biologically predisposed to have an innate urge to survive, to thrive (how could it now?). And while ‘power’ may be a method by which we can survive, power for the mere sake of power does not seem to be a justifiably tenable position given a naturalistic world view (which I’m assuming is granted for the sake of the scenario), nor does it seem to be an inherent desire present in the species as a whole. Obviously, you can use examples of Genghis Khan, Alexander the Great, etc., to say that there are desires for conquest, but one must question there motives: was it power for the mere sake of power? was it for glory? was it for remembrance (cf. Greek legend Achilles)? I don’t think I’m in a position to examine such questions.
In my opinion (and I’ll admit right now that I don’t have very strong arguments for the assertion I’m about to give quite yet. It’s a work in progress
), it would seem the only tenable foundation to build society – and, by extension, morality – would be for the flourishing of mankind. Now, the question then becomes how we can best achieve that, but that is a different conversation altogether. When we are able to establish the foundation for society (society meaning the global collective in this case), then there are objective means by which we can criticize the actions of others. But your question, I believe, wants to press me on how I am able to criticize a society which strives for power for the mere sake of power. Ultimately, we all very much have the innate urge to survive – I hope we can agree on this point. Therefore, I would have to question what the purpose of attaining the ‘power’, what would this accomplish? Presumably, even if a society wants power for power’s sake, it would still want to survive, as well. Survival, I believe, is perhaps the lowest common denominator which we can all agree upon. It is Natural Law that dictates that a species want to survive, else they succumb to extinction. Survival is what ultimately drives us. Given this urge, we can then build upon this urge to determine how best to achieve this survival. (how to do this is what I’ve tried to articulate throughout this thread). I struggle to find any other reason that seems at all tenable aside from survival. It is true that there’s no ultimate purpose for this survival, but that doesn’t really controvert anything, does it? Moreover, even while there may be societies which differ in their ultimate goals (cf. above examples), this does not mean that we cannot criticize each other. Yes, these constructions are subjective, but that doesn’t mean that there are rational responses for why my subjective reason is more rational than another’s rational reason. I don’t know if I’ve made clear my usage of ‘subjective’ earlier, but ‘subjective’, understood properly, means that it is contingent on the subject (a subset of which would be personal opinion). In other words, I don’t mean to say ‘subjective’ in the sense that paradigms are constructed purely by personal opinion, but I mean in it in the proper sense: that paradigms are constructed and are predicated on the subject (i.e. man). It is not a personal opinion of mine that man inherently has the urge to survive – this is not a personal opinion. My wanting to construct society in this way means that I am predicating society on an objectively, scientifically verifiable fact. Therefore, society, as it is a construct of man (another point which I hope you’ll agree with me on), should be informed by the subject. Not by mere personal opinion, but what we know to be true about man – that we are a social creature, that we have an inherent urge to survive, that we have a higher reasoning capacity in comparison to other animals, etc. Because society is constructed and informed by man, then it follows that morality likewise must be constructed and informed by man; insofar as we understand morality to be a tool by which we can create the idealized society. As such, to proffer a society who’s ultimate goal is power merely for power does not seem to be substantiated by what we know to be true of man, whereas a society who’s ultimate goal is survival does seem to be substantiated.
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My appeal to the ancient Greco-Roman societies was merely restricted to societal stances on homosexuality. I agree with you that there are other aspects that would seem more barbaric.
But you seem to be a bit inconsistent in your reply. The Moral Argument is contingent on the fact that there is consistency at the very least in the areas you mentioned (i.e. murder, rape, theft, etc.), and yet you mention societies in which human sacrifice was a common practice – indeed, it was a sacred practice. I recall a particular story in the O.T. (the specific passage location escapes me at the moment) in which it recounts two angels going to Lot’s dwelling. The men of the city then arrived so that they may ‘know’ his guests and Lot offer his daughters instead. While the superficial (read: modern) reading of this passage usually disgusts because of the potential rape, the story was recounted to teach about how to treat guests (cf. Hebrews 13), it was not a condemnation of the rape, but of the disrespectfulness to the guests. In fact, Lot – the very same man who saw it fit to offer his daughters rather than his guests – was named by God to be the only just man in Sodom. Furthermore, in affirmation of your point, we can read the essential glorification of the rape of women by the gods in ancient Greek literature.
Proffering the claim that the Abrahamic laws were ‘better’ than what was around at the time does little to bolster the argument of a consistent morality throughout the ages. First, if morality was indeed inherent, then it follows that there would not be a need for such an interjection by God in order to set them straight. Second, saying something is better than how it was does nothing when talking of a Law which is supposed to be perfect. It follows that if this prescribed Law was indeed perfect – which, I assume you to believe to be the case – then we should not be able to say that society has significantly progressed in terms of morality. Rather, it seems that our conceptions of morality is predicated on societal conceptions of morality, not something that is inherent.
But, if you’re not all that comfortable discussing this farther because you want to study the subject matter a bit more, I can certainly understand that! Perhaps when we have that beer?
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Despite the duration of this conversation and time between responses being long enough to allow for more advanced students to have not only re-read C. S. Lewis’s works on objective morality, transcribe them into digital form and even translate them into a new language, I have done no such reading or review of the material. Nor will I have much time to dedicate to the Moral Argument in the near future to comfortably leave this conversation hanging until I do. I apologize for not being better prepared. As a Christian revisiting the arguments for faith, I find the cosmological, teleological and moral make a case for a general deity while the historical evidence for Jesus’ resurrection (however strong or weak it may be considered) gives that deity an identity. So that’s where I’ve concentrated most of my recent efforts.
That said, to clarify my question a bit, although not in a way that negates anything you said, I meant power vs. happiness as means to ends not ends in and of themselves. The accumulation of power could lead to the accumulation of resources and secure survival in ways just as effective, if not more so, as striving for a pervasive sense of happiness. However, I think in your clarification of the term subjective, your point made in answer to my previous question still holds.
I also don’t believe that the Moral Argument is predicated on absolute universal adherence to objective moral law. Instead, it looks at the laws of a variety of societies and sees a general pattern (but not without deviation).
It’s interesting because very often when confronted with the idea that God is necessary for an objective morality, I’ve more than once heard Christopher Hitchens argue something of the reverse. That morality is indeed inherent, although coming to your same conclusion, why would we need a God to tell us what to do? To paraphrase him more directly, what did we learn at Mt. Sinai that we didn’t already know?
HOWEVER, just as I hope you don’t expect me to answer for every word out of an evangelical’s mouth, I don’t expect you to agree with Hitchens at every point, but I’ve heard the protest made often enough lately that when you wrote that sentence it struck a chord.
In any case, I will definitely return to this subject when I’m a little further along with my reviewing of the historical data. A major focus of my recent return to the discussion between faith and skepticism has been to understand more fully the counterpoints to faith’s arguments. And, while my contribution to this conversation has floundered, I thank you for the careful exposition of your position. In doing so, you’ve given me a more critical framework within which to re-evaluate this particular argument when I return to it.
And since TN is a good midpoint between TX and Chicago, I say that we have that beer somewhere near my town!
I forgot to add to my rather vague defense of the Moral Argument, that even in societies where ritualistic sacrifice was practiced, it was generally not okay to just walk up and stab your neighbor outside of that context. So we still have some adherence to the general pattern of morality with some egregious deviations, which as you have already pointed out, Christians would attribute to “sin”.
Yeah, it doesn’t do much to flesh out the argument, but it was an important point that I forgot to make.